Previous works have discussed how to represent abductive reasoning in a dynamic epistemic logic framework. It has been discussed how to define an abductive problem, how to define an abductive solution and what to do with the best solution, once this one has been selected. The present work discusses two possible ways in which the agent can select 'the best' explanation.
Introduction
Introduced to modern logic by Charles S. Peirce, abductive reasoning is typically understood as the process of looking for an explanation of a surprising observation [1, 27, 30] . 1 Many forms of intellectual tasks, like medical and fault diagnosis [7, 9, 13, 24] , scientific discovery [40, 41] , legal reasoning [8, 29] and natural language understanding [20, 21] , belong to this category, thus making abduction one of the most important and widely studied reasoning processes.
Abductive reasoning can be seen as a process consisting on different steps: identifying an abductive problem, identifying a set of possible explanations, selecting 'the best' of them and incorporating them to the current information. Among these steps, the one that has received most attention is that of finding suitable and reasonable criteria that allow us to select 'the best' explanation(s), and many authors claim that this is precisely where the 'real' abductive reasoning takes place. There are many different proposals: some approaches are based on probabilistic measurements (e.g. [11, 23, 35, 39] ), and some others use logic programming tools [22, 26] .
Of particular interest to us are approaches based on logical criteria. But, though there are several proposals (most of them based on the idea of minimality [1, 32, 42] ), it is typically argued that purely logical approaches are limited because they are unable to reason under uncertainty or to estimate the likelihood of alternative explanations. There are also approaches based on preferential orders over formulas or theories, but they have been also criticized because such orders are treated as external devices working on top of the logical or deductive part of the explanatory mechanism, and therefore seem to fall outside a logical framework.
Most approaches to abductive reasoning start with a collection of formulas, the background theory, and a single formula, the observation that creates the abductive problem. However, there are also approaches that have looked into abductive reasoning from an epistemic perspective, defining an abductive problem and an abductive explanation in terms of an agent's knowledge or beliefs [2, 6, 25] . In particular, Nepomuceno-Fernández [34] proposed an approach to abductive reasoning in terms of both knowledge and beliefs. What is interesting of this proposal is that the model that represents the agent's knowledge and beliefs is based on a plausibility order among the epistemic possibilities. Moreover, since this ordering establishes which epistemic possibilities are more plausible than others, it is very natural to use it as a criterion for selecting the best explanation. This article is based precisely on this idea: a natural criterion for an agent to select the best explanation is the plausibility order that defines her knowledge and, more importantly, her beliefs. More precisely, we argue that when an agent has to choose between two or more explanations that satisfy already some deductive relationship between her knowledge and/or beliefs and the abductive problem, the most natural choice for her is to select the explanation(s) that was (were) more plausible from her perspective, i.e. the one(s) she considered more likely before facing the abductive problem.
Our work is organized as follows. We start in Section 2 by recalling the dynamic epistemic logic (DEL) approach to abductive reasoning presented in [34] . Then in Section 3, after recalling different criteria for selecting the best explanation in abductive reasoning, we argue for the key idea behind of our work: a natural criterion for an agent to select her best explanation are her own knowledge and beliefs. Section 4 uses this idea in its most straightforward way, reviewing work on preference logic about the different forms in which a plausibility order among possible worlds can be lifted to a plausibility order among propositions, and presenting an example that shows how this allows for different agents to choose different 'best' explanations. Then in Section 5 we present a second proposal, suggesting that on a EL setting it is also possible to work with all the explanations instead of selecting just one of them, and we show how this allows, first, for the most plausible explanation to be the accepted by the agent (roughly speaking, the most plausible one is the one that she will come to believe), but also for her to have ready another explanation if the formerly best one is refuted by further observations. We finish in Section 6 with a summary of our proposals and lines for future work.
Abductive reasoning in DEL
In [34] the authors have proposed a DEL approach [46, 49] to abductive reasoning. The paper defines an abductive problem and an abductive solution in terms of an agent's knowledge and beliefs, and it proposes a way in which the chosen abductive solution can be incorporated to the agent's information. Here we recall the most important concepts and ideas. The semantic model for L, a plausibility model, is defined as follows.
Language and semantic model

DEFINITION 2.2 (Plausibility model)
Let P be a set of atomic propositions. A plausibility model is a tuple M = W ,≤,V where (1) W is a non-empty set of possible worlds; (2) ≤⊆(W ×W ) is a locally connected 2 and conversely well-founded 3 preorder 4 , the plausibility relation, representing the plausibility order of the worlds from the agent's point of view (w ≤ u is read as 'u is at least as plausible as w' or, alternatively, as 'w is at most as plausible as u'); (3) V : W → ℘(P) is an atomic valuation function, indicating the atomic propositions in P that are true at each possible world. A pointed plausibility model (M ,w) is a plausibility model with a distinguished world w ∈ W , the evaluation point.
The key idea behind plausibility models is that an agent's beliefs can be defined as what is true in the most plausible worlds from the agent's perspective, and modalities for the plausibility relation ≤ will allow us to do that. In order to define the agent's knowledge, the approach is to assume that two worlds are epistemically indistinguishable for the agent if and only if she considers one of them at least as plausible as the other (i.e. if they are comparable via ≤). Then, the epistemic indistinguishability relation ∼ can be defined as the union of ≤ and its converse, i.e. as ∼:=≤ ∪ ≥. This indistinguishability relation should not be confused with the equal plausibility relation, denoted by , and defined as the intersection of ≤ and ≥, i.e. :=≤ ∩ ≥. For more details and discussion, we refer to [3] .
EXAMPLE 2.1
The following diagram represents a plausibility model M based on the atomic propositions P := {l,e,b}. Circles represent possible worlds (named w 1 up to w 5 ), and each one of them includes exactly the atomic propositions that are true at that world (e.g. at w 2 , the atomic propositions l and e are true, but b is false). Arrows represent the plausibility relation, with transitive arcs omitted (we have w 4 ≤ w 5 ≤ w 2 ≤ w 1 ≤ w 3 , but also w 4 ≤ w 2 , w 4 ≤ w 1 , w 4 ≤ w 3 and so on). Moreover, ∼ is then the full Cartesian product, i.e. for every worlds u and v in the model, u ∼ v. Defining knowledge and beliefs. The notion of knowledge in plausibility models is defined by means of the indistinguishability relation in the standard way: the agent knows ϕ at some world w if and only if ϕ is the case in every world she considers epistemically possible from w. 5 We can use the modality [∼] for this. For the notion of beliefs the idea is that the agent believes ϕ at a given w if and only if ϕ is the case in the most plausible worlds from w. Thanks to the properties of the plausibility relation (a locally connected and conversely well-founded preorder), ϕ is true in the most plausible (i.e. the ≤-maximal) worlds from w if and only if, following the plausibility order, from some moment on there are only ϕ-worlds (see [3, 5, 43] for the technical details). Then we can use the plausibility modalities ≤ and [≤] for this. Summarizing, we have the following:
The agent knows ϕ:
The agent believes ϕ:
Observe how, thanks to the definition of the indistinguishability relation ∼ as the union of ≤ and ≥, the formula Kϕ → Bϕ is valid (but its converse is not). The dual of these notions, epistemic possibility and most likely possibility, can be defined as the correspondent modal duals:
Consider the plausibility model M of Example 2.1, and take w 2 as the evaluation point. We have w 2 ∼ u for every possible world u in the model, and hence every world in the model is epistemically possible from w 2 's perspective. But every world in the model satisfies b → l (the implication is true at w 2 , w 1 and w 3 because the antecedent b is false, and true at w 4 and w 5 because the consequent l is true), so A more detailed description of this framework, its technical details, its axiom system and the notions that can be defined in it can be found in [3] .
Following the DEL idea, actions that modify an agent's knowledge and beliefs can be represented as operations that transform the semantic model representing them. We will now recall operations that can be applied over plausibility models, providing also extensions of the language that allow us to describe the changes such operations bring about. They will be used in Subsection 2.3 to define an abductive problem and an abductive modality.
Operations on plausibility models
The most natural operation over Kripke-like semantic models is the update. This operation reduces the domain of the model, and it is typically given in terms of the formula the worlds should satisfy in order to survive the operation. This operation reduces the model's domain, preserving only those worlds that satisfy the given ψ and restricting the plausibility relation and the atomic valuation function accordingly. Since we go to a sub-model, the operation preserves local connectedness, converse well-foundedness, reflexivity and transitivity (the properties of the plausibility relation), and hence it preserves plausibility models.
In order to describe the effects of an update we use existential modalities of the form ψ! for every formula ψ. Here is their semantic interpretation.
(M ,w) ψ! ϕ iff (M ,w) ψ and (M ψ! ,w) ϕ
In words, an update formula ψ! ϕ holds at (M ,w) if and only if ψ is the case (i.e. the evaluation point will survive the operation), and after the update ϕ is the case. The universal modality [ψ!] is defined as the modal dual of ψ! , i.e. [ψ!] ϕ := ¬ ψ! ¬ϕ.
Besides being the most natural operation over Kripke-like models, an update has also a straightforward epistemic interpretation: it works as an act of a public announcement [16, 38] or, as we will call it, an act of observation. When the agent observes a given ψ she can discard those epistemically possible worlds that do not satisfy it, obtaining thus a model only with worlds that satisfied ψ before the operation. More details on this operation and its modalities can be found in the papers [16, 38] or the textbooks [46, 49] .
EXAMPLE 2.3
Consider the model M in Example 2.1 again. Suppose that the agent observes l. We model this as an update with l, which yields the following model M l! :
The most plausible world in M has been discarded in M l! . As we explained in Example 2.2, the agent believes ¬l in M , but after the observation this is not the case anymore: ¬l does not hold in the most plausible world of the new model M l! . In fact, ¬l does not hold in any epistemically possible world, and thus after the observation the agent knows l, i.e.
Another natural operation over our models is the rearrangement of worlds within an epistemic partition. Of course, there are several ways in which a new order can be defined. The following one, called radical upgrade, is one of the many possibilities. DEFINITION 2.5 (Upgrade operation) Let M = W ,≤,V be a plausibility model and let ψ be a formula in L. The upgrade operation produces the plausibility model M ψ⇑ = W ,≤ ,V , differing from M just in the plausibility order, given now by
The new plausibility relation states that after an upgrade with ψ, 'all ψ-worlds become more plausible than all ¬ψ-worlds, and within the two zones the old ordering remains' [44] . More precisely, a world u will be at least as plausible as a world w, w ≤ u, if and only if they have already that order and u satisfies ψ, or they have already that order and w satisfies ¬ψ, or they are comparable, w satisfies ¬ψ and u satisfies ψ. This operation preserves the properties of the plausibility relation and hence plausibility models, as shown in [50] .
In order to describe the effects of this operation we introduce, for every formula ψ, an existential modality ψ ⇑ .
In words, an upgrade formula ψ ⇑ ϕ holds at (M ,w) if and only if ϕ is the case after an upgrade with ψ. The universal modality [ψ ⇑] is defined as the modal dual of ψ ⇑ , as in the update case.
This operation also has a very natural epistemic interpretation. The plausibility relation defines the agent's beliefs, so changes in it can be interpreted as changes in the agent's beliefs [3, 44, 48] . In particular, an act of revising beliefs after a reliable and yet fallible source has suggested ψ can be represented by an operation that puts ψ-worlds at the top of the plausibility order. 7 Details on the operation and its modalities can be found in the papers [3, 44, 48] or the textbook [46] .
Abductive problem and abductive solution
It is possible to describe abductive reasoning within the plausibility models framework. Here we recall the most important ideas and definitions; for a more detailed discussion and comparison to the literature we refer to [34] .
For the definition of an abductive problem, there are two key ideas. The first is that an abductive problem is fired by an epistemic action (typically, an observation), so we have to consider two phases: the one before the epistemic action and the one after it. The second is that the action will turn a given formula into an abductive problem if the formula is known after the action but was not known before. 8 Thus, we get the following. For the definition of an abductive solution, we look at the stage before the observation. The idea behind this definition is that the agent looks for formulas that would have helped her to get to know the abductive problem formula before the epistemic action that turned it into an abductive problem. 
An abductive modality
Once the agent has selected an explanation, what should she do with it? The proposal of [34] is that the chosen solution should be incorporated as a belief. DEFINITION 2.8 (Modality for implication-based abduction) Let (M ,w) be a pointed plausibility model and consider again (M ψ! ,w), the pointed plausibility model that results from observing ψ at (M ,w). For every pair of formulas η and χ in L we define an existential modality that allows us to build formulas of the form Abd χ η ϕ, read as 'the agent can perform an abductive step for χ with η after which ϕ is the case'. Its semantic interpretation is as follows:
Equivalently, we can define the semantic interpretation of Abd
The correspondent universal modality, [Abd it cannot be incorporated as knowledge (abductive solutions are, after all, just hypotheses, subject to revision in the light of further information), but it can be incorporated as a belief.
As a further reason why this form of incorporating the abductive solution makes sense, consider what happens when the chosen solution is a trivial one, i.e. (1) it is the abductive problem itself (or any formula logically equivalent to it) or (2) it is a contradiction (to the agent's knowledge, or a logical contradiction). In both cases the upgrade operation will not make any change in the model, in (1) because the agent knows the abductive problem formula, and hence every epistemically possible world satisfies it, and in (2) because no epistemically possible world satisfies it. Thus, trivial solutions can be discarded, not because of their form, as is typically done, but because of their effect: accepting them will not give the agent any new information.
Selecting the best explanation
Finding suitable and reasonable criteria for selecting the best explanation is a fundamental problem in abductive reasoning [19, 27] , and in fact many authors consider this to be the heart of the subject. The result of abductive reasoning is an hypothesis, typically chosen among a wide range of candidates. The thesis of purpose, stated in [19] , establishes that the purpose of scientific abduction is (i) to generate new hypotheses; and (ii) to select hypotheses for further examination and testing. Hence a central issue in scientific abduction is to provide methods for selecting. Because the true state of the world is unknown, selecting the best explanation requires more than just consistency with the available information, and there are many proposals of what these extra criteria should be.
There are approaches based on probabilistic measurements (e.g. [11, 23, 35, 39] ). Even Sherlock Holmes advised that to evaluate explanations we 'balance probabilities and choose the most likely' (The Hound of the Baskervilles). But, unfortunately, explanations rarely come equipped with probabilities.
In logic programming, a common strategy is to look for abductive solutions at the dead ends of Prolog proofs [10] . Sound and complete procedures can be defined also by using stable models and answer sets [22, 26] . Apart from selection criteria based on consistency and integrity constraints, it is common to start with a set of abducible predicates and select explanations built only from ground atoms using these predicates.
There are also approaches that use logical criteria, but beyond requisites to avoid triviality (e.g. the explanation should not contradict the theory, the explanation should not be the observation itself; see [1] ), the definition of suitable criteria is still an open problem. One of the most pursued ideas is that of minimality, either syntactically (e.g. [32, 42] look for literals) or semantically (minimal explanations are those equivalent to any other explanations they imply; [1] ). Moreover, we can look for minimality with respect to the set of possible explanations (the best explanation is the weakest, i.e. the one that is implied by the rest of them), but we can also look for minimality with respect to the current information (the best explanation is the one that disrupt less the current information).
Typical logical selection criteria are based on restrictions on the logical form of the solutions but, as mentioned in [1] , finer criteria to select between two equally valid solutions require contextual aspects. With this idea in mind some approaches have proposed to use an ordering among formulas [15, 25, 33] or among full theories (i.e. possible worlds; [36, 37] ). In particular, for the latter, a typical option is the use of preferential models (e.g. [31] ), in which preferential criteria for selecting the best explanation are regarded as qualitative properties that are beyond the pure causal or deductive relationship between an explanandum and its explanans. But these preference criteria are normally treated as an external device which works on top of the logical or deductive part of the explanatory mechanism, and as thus it has been criticized because it seems to fall outside a logical framework.
Selecting the best explanation based on the agent's beliefs
There is, nevertheless, an interesting alternative. As mentioned in the introduction, there are proposals that have studied abductive reasoning from a more 'subjective' point of view, defining abductive problem and abductive solution in terms of an agent's knowledge and beliefs. This gives us a new perspective because now we can use the agent's beliefs as a criterion for selecting the best explanation. In particular, by using the framework presented in Section 2 we will be still using an ordering (the plausibility order), but this ordering is not an external device anymore; it is precisely what defines the agent's knowledge and beliefs.
Consider, for instance, the following variation of a typical example.
Mary and Gaby arrive late to Mary's apartment; they press the light switch but the light does not turn on. Knowing that the apartment is old, Mary assumes a failure in the electric line as the explanation for the light not turning on. Gaby, on the other hand, does not have any information about the apartment, so she explains the light not turning on by assuming that the bulb is burned out.
After pressing the switch, both Mary and Gaby observe that the light does not turn on. There are several possible explanations for this: it is possible that the electric line failed, as Mary assumed, but it can also be the case that the bulb is burned out, as Gaby thinks, and it is even possible that the switch is faulty. Then, why do they choose a different explanation? The reason is that, though they both observe that the light does not turn on, they have different 'background' information: Mary knows that the apartment is old, and hence she considers a failure in the electric line more likely than any other explanation, but Gaby does not have that piece of information, so for her a burned out bulb explains the lack of light better.
In general, what the example shows is that, even when facing the same 'surprising observation' (the light does not turn on), agents with different knowledge and beliefs may choose a different 'best' explanation: while Mary assumes that the electric line has failed, Gaby thinks that the bulb is burned out. Both explanations are equally 'logical' since either a failure on the electric line or else a burned out bulb is enough to explain why the light does not turn on. What makes Mary to choose the first and Gaby the second is that they have different knowledge and different beliefs. This suggest first, that, instead of looking for criteria to select the best explanation, we should look for a criteria to select the agent's best explanation.
Even more, the explanation an agent will choose for a given abductive problem depends not only on how the problematic formula could have been predicted, but also on what the agent herself knows and what she considers more likely to be the case. It could be argued that this criterion is not 'logical' in the classical sense because it is not based exclusively on the deductive relationship between the observed fact and the different ways in which it could have been derived. Nevertheless, it is logical in a broader sense since it does depend on the agent's information: her knowledge and her beliefs. In particular, in the framework we have recalled in Section 2, the agent's knowledge and beliefs are defined in terms of a plausibility relation among epistemic possibilities, so it is natural to use precisely this relation as a criterion for selecting each agent's best explanation(s).
In the rest of this article we present two possible uses of this idea. We first show how this plausibility order among possible worlds can be lifted to a plausibility order among propositions, thus giving us a straightforward criterion to select the best explanation (Section 4). Then we show how in this DEL setting is also possible to work with all explanations, and we show the advantages this has (Section 5).
'The best' as 'the most plausible'
The plausibility model provides us an ordering among epistemic possibilities, i.e. among possible worlds. This order can be lifted to get an ordering among set of worlds, i.e. formulas within the language. The different ways in which such ordering can be defined has been studied in preference logic (see, e.g., [17, 45, 47] or, for a more detailed exposition, Chapter 3.3 of [28] ); in this section we will recall the main ideas and we will show how they can be applied to the task of selecting the best explanation in abductive reasoning.
In general, given an ordering ≤ between objects, we can define an ordering among sets of those objects in different ways. For example, if the order represents preferences, we can say that we prefer ψ-objects (i.e. objects satisfying the property ψ) over ϕ-ones when there is a ψ-object that is preferred over a ϕ-one (a ∃∃ preference of ψ over ϕ). But we can also be more drastic and say that we prefer ψ-objects over ϕ-ones when every ψ-object is preferred to every ϕ-one (a ∀∀ preference of ψ over ϕ). Among the different ways in which an ordering among objects can be lifted to an ordering among sets of objects, there are four obvious ones:
ϕ ≤ ∃∃ ψ iff there is a ϕ-object w and there is a ψ-object u such that w ≤ u ϕ ≤ ∀∃ ψ iff for every ϕ-object w there is a ψ-object u such that w ≤ u ϕ ≤ ∀∀ ψ iff for every ϕ-object w and for every ψ-object u we have w ≤ u ϕ ≤ ∃∀ ψ iff there is a ϕ-object w such that for every ψ-object u we have w ≤ u
The first two of these orderings are easily expressible within our language L:
The first formula indicates that there is a ψ-world that is at least as plausible as a ϕ-one, ϕ ≤ ∃∃ ψ, exactly when there is an epistemic possibility that satisfies ϕ and that can see an at least as plausible ψ-world. The second one only changes the first quantification: for every ϕ-world there is a ψ-world that is at least as possible. The last two orderings are not immediate. Given the formulas for the previous two orderings, one could propose [∼](ϕ → [≤]ψ) for the ∀∀ case, but this formula is not correct: though it states that every world that is at least as plausible as any ϕ-world satisfies ψ, nothing guarantees that every ψ-world is indeed above every ϕ-world: (1) there might be a ψ-world incomparable to some ϕ-one, or even if all worlds are comparable; and (2) there might be a ψ-world strictly below a ϕ-one. 9 But our plausibility order is locally connected (i.e. inside each epistemic partition, every world is comparable to each other), so (1) cannot occur. Then we only need to check that case (2) does not happen: we should be sure that no ψ-world is strictly below a ϕ-one or, in other words, we need to check that for each ψ-world, every world that is strictly more plausible than it satisfies ¬ϕ. Thus, by extending our language with a modality for <, we have the following: 9 The strict version of ≤, <, is defined in the following way: w < u if and only if w ≤ u and not u ≤ w.
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An epistemic and dynamic approach to abductive reasoning 953 Finally, for the ∃∀ ordering we have a similar situation. Following the first two cases we could propose ∼ (ϕ ∧[≤]ψ) but the formula does not work because, even if it holds, there might be a ψ-world incomparable to the ϕ-one, and even if all epistemically possible worlds are comparable (as it is the case), there might be a ψ-world below the ϕ-one. In order to be sure that there is a ϕ-world that is at most as plausible as every ψ-world, we should be sure that every world that is strictly less plausible that this ϕ-world satisfies ¬ψ. Thus, by extending again our language, this time with a modality for >, we get
All in all, the important fact is that among these four orderings on sets of worlds (i.e. formulas), two are definable with our language and the other two only need simple extensions. This shows how the plausibility order among worlds that defines the agent's knowledge and beliefs (Subsection 2.1) also provides us with a criterion for selecting the most plausible among a set of formulas, and hence provides us with a criterion for selecting the best abductive solution for a given agent. We will now show how this criterion can be used, and how it leads to situations in which agents with different knowledge and beliefs choose different 'best' explanations.
An example
Recall Mary and Gaby's example. Both observe that after pressing the switch the light does not turn on, but each one of them chooses a different explanation: while Mary assumes that the electric line failed, Gaby thinks that the bulb is burned out. As we have argued, the reason why they choose different explanations is that they have different knowledge and beliefs. In this subsection, we will formalize this process within the framework introduced in the previous sections.
The following plausibility models show Mary and Gaby's knowledge and beliefs before pressing the switch. They involve tree atomic propositions: l standing for lack of light, e standing for a failure in the electric line and b standing for a burned out bulb. Again, each possible world has indicated within it exactly those atomic propositions that are true in each one of them, and the arrows represent the plausibility relation (transitive arrows are omitted).
Observe how both Mary and Gaby know that a failure on the electric line implies lack of light and that a burned out bulb also implies lack of light (both e → l and b → l hold in every world). In fact, the only difference in the models is the plausibility order between worlds w 2 and w 4 . Mary knows that the apartment is old so she considers a failure on the line (e) more likely than a burned out bulb (b), and hence the situation where the electric line fails but the bulb is not burned out (w 2 ) is more likely than its opposite (w 4 ). Gaby, on the other hand, does not know anything about the apartment, and hence for her a burned out bulb with a working electric line (w 4 ) is more plausible than a working bulb and a failing electric line (w 2 ). We also assume that the most like possibility for both of them is the one in which light, electric line and bulb, work correctly (w 1 ), and that the least plausible possibility is the one in which everything fails (w 5 ).
After they both observe that the switch does not turn on the light, the unique world where l is not the case, w 3 , is eliminated; this gives us the following models.
As a result of the observation, Mary and Gaby know that there is no light (Kl holds in both models), something that they did not know before. Thus, following Definition 2.6, both have an abductive problem with l.
According to Definition 2.7, both e and b are abductive solutions for l for both Mary and Gaby: both formulas are the antecedent of implications that have l as a consequent and that were known before the observation. So, how can each one of them choose their own best explanation? For Mary, the only ordering that puts b above e is the weakest one, ∃∃ (there is a b-world, w 4 , at least as plausible as a e-one, w 5 ). Nevertheless, e is above b not only in the weak ∃∃ way (w 2 is at least as plausible as w 4 ) but also in the stronger ∀∃-way (every b-world has a e-world that is at least as plausible as it). Hence, e is a more plausible explanation from Mary's perspective. In Gaby's case something analogous happens: b is above e not only in the weak ∃∃ way (w 4 is at least as plausible as w 2 ) but also in the strong ∀∃-way. Hence, for Gaby, b is the most plausible explanation.
Thus, Mary and Gaby can perform an abductive step, each one of them with their respective best explanation. In Mary's case, worlds satisfying e (w 5 and w 2 ) will become more plausible than worlds that do not satisfy it (w 4 and w 1 ). In Gaby's case, worlds satisfying b (w 5 and w 4 ) will become more plausible than worlds that do not satisfy it (w 2 and w 1 ). This produces the following models.
As a result of the abductive step each agent believes her own explanation: Mary believes that the electric line has failed (e is true in her unique most plausible world w 2 ), and Gaby believes that the bulb is burned out (b is true in her unique most plausible world w 4 ).
Working with all the explanations
By using her own plausibility order, the agent can select the most likely explanation from her own perspective. Once this explanation has been chosen, she can incorporate it to her information, reaching in this way an epistemic state in which worlds where the chosen explanation was true become more plausible than the rest. Roughly speaking, the agent will come to believe the chosen explanation.
The reason abductive solutions are incorporated as beliefs and not as knowledge is because the selected explanation (in fact, any explanation) is just a hypothesis, subject to change in light of further information. Consider, e.g. Mary and Gaby's situation after their respective abductive steps. Suppose that both of them take a closer look at the bulb and observe that it is not burned out (¬b). Semantically this is simply an observation operation that eliminates w 4 and w 5 , exactly those epistemic possibilities where the bulb is burned out (i.e. where b holds). The resulting models are the following.
This observation does not affect Mary's explanation: she still believes that the electric line has failed (e is true in her unique most plausible world w 2 ). But Gaby's case is different: she does not have an explanation for l anymore. Though she knows it (Kl holds at the model on the bottom, i.e. l is true in every epistemic possibility), she does not know/believe the antecedent of a known implication with l as a consequent (besides, of course, the trivial ones); she needs to perform a further abductive step in order to explain it.
There is, nevertheless, a way to avoid this extra abductive reasoning step. Recall that after applying the defined upgrade operation (Definition 2.5), the one that we use for changing the agent's beliefs, all the worlds satisfying the given formula become more plausible than the ones that do not satisfy it, and within the two zones the old ordering remains. This tells us that, if instead of 'lifting' the worlds that satisfy the agent's most plausible explanation, we 'lift' the worlds that satisfy at least one of the possible explanations, we will get a model in which there will be two layers, the lower one with worlds that do not satisfy any explanation, and the upper one with worlds that satisfy at least one. But inside the upper layer the old ordering will remain. In other words, the most plausible worlds in the resulting model (i.e. the most plausible ones in the upper layer) will be the ones that satisfy at least one explanation and that were already more plausible than the rest. Thus, we get the same desired result: after such upgrade, roughly, the agent will believe the explanation that was the most plausible for her.
The difference with respect to the approach of the previous section is that the worlds that appear below the most plausible ones are not arbitrary. Worlds on the 'second best' layer satisfy already some explanation; an explanation that was not 'chosen' because it was not the most plausible one. Then, if further observations make the original 'best' explanation obsolete, once that the correspondent (and now also obsolete) worlds have been discarded, the ones that will be at the top of the plausibility ordering will be the previously 'second best'. Thus, an explanation will be already present and no further abductive steps will be needed.
A modality with all the explanations
We will now introduce a modality that, given an abductive problem χ , upgrades those worlds that satisfy at least one of its abductive explanations. DEFINITION 5.1 (Modality for formula-based abduction) Let (M ,w) be a pointed plausibility model and consider again (M ψ! ,w), the pointed plausibility model that results from observing ψ at (M ,w). For every formula χ in L we define an existential modality that allows us to build formulas of the form Abdχ ϕ, read as 'the agent can perform a complete abductive step for χ after which ϕ is the case'. Its semantic interpretation is as follows:
where χ is the set of abductive solutions for χ , i.e.
Equivalently, we can define the semantic interpretation of Abdχ ϕ as
The correspondent universal modality, [Abdχ ], is defined as usual.
The definition states that Abdχ ϕ is true at (M ψ! ,w) if and only if (1) χ is an abductive problem at (M ψ! ,w), and (2) after upgrading with χ we will have ϕ. The last part makes precise our idea of working with all the solutions: χ contains all abductive solutions for χ , so χ is a disjunction characterizing those worlds that satisfy at least one of them. Then after an upgrade with it the upper layer will consist on exactly these worlds. But inside this upper layer the former plausibility order will persist, and hence worlds at the top of it will be precisely those that satisfy at least one solution for χ and, among them, were already the most plausible ones.
REMARK 5.1
The set χ contains, among others, χ , χ ∧χ and so on, and hence χ is an infinite disjunction. In order to avoid such situations we can impose syntactic restrictions when defining χ (e.g. asking for solutions that are also minimal conjunctions of literals). Another possibility, closer to the semantic spirit of this approach, is to work with finite plausibility models, and then look for solutions among the formulas that characterize each possible world.
We will show now how this operation allows the agent to have ready another explanation in case the initially 'best' one is not the case.
The example revisited
Let us go back to Mary and Gaby's example all the way to the stage in after which they have observed that the light does not turn on (models Mary l! and Gaby l! on top of page 954, repeated here).
Suppose that, instead of selecting their respective most plausible explanation and assimilating it (as they did in Subsection 4.1), Mary and Gaby work with all their explanations. Then, instead of an upgrade with e for Mary and an upgrade with b for Gaby, we have an upgrade with e∨b for both. This produces the following situation.
The worlds satisfying e∨b (w 2 , w 4 and w 5 ) have been upgraded. As a result of this, both Mary and Gaby have an explanation for l, but each one of them has her own explanation: while Mary believes that the electric line has failed (e is the case in the most plausible world at the model on the top), Gaby believes that the bulb is burned out (b holds in the most plausible world at the model on the bottom).
So far the result of the upgrade is, with respect to Mary and Gaby beliefs, exactly the same as with the previous proposal where only worlds that satisfy the most plausible explanation are upgraded (in both cases, w 2 and w 4 are Mary's and Gaby's most plausible worlds, respectively). But observe what happens now when they both observe that the bulb is in fact not burned out (¬b): such action produces the following situation.
Again, the observation does not affect Mary's explanation (e still holds in the most plausible world at model on the top), but it does change Gaby's since her previous explanation b is not possible anymore. The difference is that now she does not need to perform an extra abductive step because she has already another explanation: she now believes that the electric line has failed (e holds in the most plausible world at model on the bottom).
Thus, after an upgrade with all explanations, what the agent will be lead to believe depends on her plausibility order, just as with the first proposal. Nevertheless, if further information invalidates such 'best' explanation, the agent will believe the 'next to best' one without the need of further abductive steps.
Summary and further work
We have recalled a DEL approach to abductive reasoning that defines an abductive problem and an abductive solution in terms of an agent's knowledge and beliefs. Then we have shown how, within this framework, the plausibility order that defines the agent's knowledge and beliefs can be used to choose the the most plausible explanation for a given abductive problem: if the agent has to choose between two or more explanations that satisfy already some deductive relationship between her knowledge and/or beliefs and the abductive problem, the most natural choice for her is to select the explanation(s) that was (were) more plausible from her perspective. We have used this idea in two ways: first, by recalling different ways in which the plausibility order among worlds can be lifted to a plausibility order among formulas and then using these orderings to select the 'best' explanation, and second, by working with all explanations at the same time, thus allowing the agent to have ready another explanation in case the initially 'best' one turns out to be incorrect.
The present work and its predecessor [34] are just the first steps towards a study of abductive reasoning from a DEL perspective in which the main actors are the different attitudes an agent has towards information and the diverse actions that modify it. Two interesting aspects to be explored are settings with non-omniscient agents (e.g. on the lines of [50] or [12] ) and also the involvement of weaker notions of information (e.g. the safe beliefs of [3] or the strong beliefs of [4] ). Maybe more importantly, our works have studied a form of abductive reasoning that does not involve the creation of new concepts or even changes in the agent's awareness. A study of these other understandings of what abductive reasoning does will allow us to complete the picture.
